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Abstract
This paper sketches some of the main external and internal 
macroeconomic challenges confronting Peru over the near- 
and medium-term. It argues that Peru’s main macroeconomic 
challenges could be summarized in three main headings:
First, the Peruvian economy is currently in a period of 
transition from the biggest resource boom since the mid-
1950s to a “new normal” characterized by weaker foreign 
demand, falling metal prices and expectations of rising 
interest rates at the international level. Transition to a “new 
normal” has its own challenges, which, in the case of a small 
open economy like Peru, are currently being heightened by 
the abovementioned global conditions.
Second, transition to a new normal is happening under robust 
initial conditions, which could be summarized by the Peruvian 
economy’s sound macroeconomic fundamentals, and its 
underlying flexibility. Such flexibility helped the economy 
dealing with the upswing of the mining development boom 
and should help us in the downswing.
Third, macroeconomic policy—particularly monetary and 
exchange rate policy—is helping in this adjustment, although 
a successful transition may need to be supported by a number 
of structural policies, that are noted in the paper.
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Resumen
Esta nota esboza algunos de los principales desafíos 
macroeconómicos externos e internos que enfrenta Perú en 
el corto y mediano plazo. La nota centra la discusión de los 
desafíos en tres grandes acápites:
En primer lugar, la economía peruana se encuentra 
actualmente en un período de transición de la bonanza 
minera más grande desde mediados de la década de 1950 a una 
“nueva normalidad” caracterizada por una demanda externa 
débil, caída de los precios de los minerales, y expectativas de 
aumento en tasa de interés a nivel mundial. La transición a 
una “nueva normalidad” tiene sus propios retos, los cuales, en 
el caso de una economía pequeña y abierta como el Perú, están 
exacerbados por un entorno externo macroeconómico débil.
En segundo lugar, la transición a una nueva normalidad está 
sucediendo en condiciones iniciales robustas, lo que podría 
resumirse en sólidos fundamentos de la economía peruana, y 
su flexibilidad macroeconómica subyacente. Esta flexibilidad 
ayudó a la economía durante la fase de expansión del boom 
minero y debe también ayudarla en la fase descendente.
En tercer lugar, la política monetaria y, sobre todo, la política 
de tipo de cambio ayudó—y está ayudando—en este ajuste, 
aunque una transición exitosa a la “nueva normalidad” 
podría beneficiarse de un número de políticas estructurales 
resumidas en el documento.
Palabras clave
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I. Introduction
This paper reviews the external and internal macroeconomic 
challenges confronting Peru over the near- and medium-term. 
It argues that Peru’s main macroeconomic challenges could be 
summarized in three main headings:
First, the Peruvian economy is currently in a period of 
transition from the biggest resource boom since the mid-
1950s to a “new normal” characterized by weaker foreign 
demand (mainly from a key trading partner, China), falling 
metal prices (Peru’s top export goods), and expectations of 
rising interest rates at the international level. Transition to a 
“new normal” has its own challenges, which, in the case of a 
small open economy like Peru, are currently being heightened 
by the abovementioned global conditions.
Second, transition to a new normal is happening under 
robust initial conditions, which could be summarized by the 
Peruvian economy’s sound macroeconomic fundamentals, 
and its underlying flexibility. Such flexibility helped the 
economy dealing with the upswing of the mining development 
boom and should help us in the downswing.
Third, macroeconomic policy—particularly monetary and 
exchange rate policy—is helping in this adjustment, although 
a successful transition may need to be supported by a number 
of structural policies. The latter include: (i) further-opening 
of the economy, while supporting new sources of growth 
in the tradable goods sector and sustainable foreign direct 
investment economy-wide; (ii) fostering a strong growth of 
fixed capital formation in machinery and equipment, which 
is, unfortunately, relatively expensive by regional standards; 
and (iii) adding flexibility in the local labor market to increase 
labor productivity and sustain wage and employment growth 
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despite the hardening of international (and domestic) market 
conditions. Such containment of unit labor costs (ULCs) should, 
in turn, support a lasting surge growth in private investment 
and increase potential output.
The paper elaborates on each of the issues identified going 
forward. It sketches macroeconomic trends in Peru’s main 
trading partners, as they represent an important (“exogenous”) 
contributor to the adjustment that Peru is going through. It then 
focuses on the adjustment that is either due or taking place in 
the Peruvian economy.
II. The External Environment
Peru’s main trading partners consist of four main country 
blocks. These blocks include the Latin American country block 
(including, mainly, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Bolivia, Panama, Argentina, and Venezuela), the United States, 
China, and the European Union.
Trade with Latin America has almost doubled (as a share of 
total exports of goods and services) during the last 18 years 
and represents around 21 percent of Peru’s exports of goods 
and services (Table 1). Except for Mexico, Peru’s exports to 
each of the other Latin American countries have increased 
sharply, likely during the period along rapid growth in private 
consumption and investment recorded in all those countries. 
The years 2014 and 2015 have not been particularly good for 
Latin America. This mainly reflects Brazil’s and Venezuela’s 
recessions that create an important drag on overall growth in 
the region. Notably, Peru’s exports to Brazil and Chile are in the 
order of US$2 billion dollars, each, or about a total of 10 percent 
of Peru’s total exports. Exports of services to both countries are 
also important and growing. Commodity exports to Venezuela 
16
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are more limited, hovering around US$500 million dollars in 
recent years.
Trade with the U.S. has been traditionally very important, 
with the American market being a key destination of Peruvian 
exports of minerals and agro-industrial goods for long. Total 
exports to the US, averaging about US$7 billion in recent years 
(including a large contingent of gold exports) have remained 
somewhat stagnant since 2008, as the American economy 
struggled with the macroeconomic effects stemming from the 
2008/09 global financial crisis.
Table 1
Peru: Direction of Trade: Exports of G &S, 1997-2014 (In % of total 
exports G & S)
1997-2002 2003-2007 2008-2014
Latin America 12.6 26.1 20.8
USA 27.4 18.6 17.8
China 5.6 9.0 12.7
EU 9.1 9.3 12.2
Switzerland 6.8 6.4 7.0
Japan 5.6 4.1 4.1
Other countries 33.0 26.7 25.4
Source: INEI & IMF.
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Despite setbacks, the good news is that, the American 
economy is currently recording above-average, albeit volatile, 
growth and the unemployment rate is around estimates of full 
employment (5.1 percent). Monetary policy in the US remains 
accommodative, and thus supportive of aggregate demand, 
with the Federal Funds Rate within a 0-.25 percent margin. The 
expectation is that at some point before too long, the health of the 
American economy would be sufficiently strong for the Federal 
Reserve to start a process of monetary policy normalization 
and increase leading interest rates. A stronger US economy 
would benefit the global economy, including Peru, although 
global financial markets may need to be carefully monitored 
for volatility and potential crises, given that the policy rate in 
the US has been almost zero for about 7 years.
Economic and financial developments in China—a key 
destination for Peru’s exports of raw materials (minerals 
and fishmeal)—are always in the news and merit, possibly, 
some longer explanation. Note that China represents some 13 
percent of our total exports, more than twice the share in the 
late 1990s, early 2000s. Indeed, China is currently the second 
largest economy in the world and has been an important 
destination of raw materials from developing and emerging 
market countries, including Peru, in the last decade. Those 
inputs of raw materials helped propelled a massive boost in 
Chinese export manufacturing products and supported very 
high rates of domestic investment.
The news (somewhat old to date) is that the Chinese export-
oriented and investment-intensive growth model now 
yielding lower GDP growth rates than before (i.e., a reduction 
in actual and potential output growth) and China is also 
dealing with a number of structural problems (Chart 1).
18
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These structural challenges include, in particular,
 ◆ Transiting from an investment-led growth to consumption-
led growth. For one, China’s private consumption as a share 
of GDP is around 40 percent, compared to rates of 60 to 70 
percent in countries with comparable income per-capita. 
For example, private consumption in Peru, with a per-capita 
income of about US$6.000 at current exchange rates (or just 
some 10 percent higher than China´s per capita income) is 
about 63 percent of GDP, a measure that is broadly in line 
with world averages.
 ◆ Dealing with demographic change, as the working age 
population declines and the overall population ages.
 ◆ Dealing with financial “repression”, understood in terms 
of existing interest rate subsidies and directed credit. As well 
as, “shadow banking” and property market constraints.
Figure 1. China: Real GDP Growth Rate, 2008-2017 (In %)
 
Source: IMF.
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Comforting, however, is that China is still growing at 
relatively high rates (5 percent to 6 percent, depending who 
you read) and the Chinese authorities are acting to address the 
economy’s deceleration, although the judge is still out assessing 
the impact of those policies. Recent policies to support China´s 
growth include, among others: (i) the reduction in benchmark 
interest rates and bank reserve requirements to support 
liquidity, particularly, in a context of large capital outflows; (ii) 
increased public spending in infrastructure; and (iii) the highly 
publicized nominal depreciation of the Renminbi against the 
US dollar.
In sum, China is no longer growing (or expected to grow) 
at the extraordinary rates of the past. Yet, growth in China 
persists at a relatively high rate and Peru needs to make the 
most from this important trade relationship, while being 
aware of the risks for Chinese growth (and financial stability) 
and thus for our exports.
For the global economy as a whole—including the EU—the 
situation is that economic growth remains weak, although 
it is being supported by a number of events. The latter 
refers mainly to low oil prices, less of a drag in terms of fiscal 
consolidation supported by accommodative monetary policies. 
Yet, as noted above, the high point, globally, is the ongoing 
recovery of the US economy—despite volatility in the monthly 
industrial data—and the hope that the Chinese authorities deal 
effectively with the downswing of their own business cycle.
All in all, as a total, our trading partners are projected to grow 
by about 2.5 to 2.7 percent a year during the next two years. 
These growth rates compare with rates in the order of 4.0 to 
4.5 percent a year, a decade ago.
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Table 2
Peru Trading Partners: Growth Performance & Prospects, 2013-16 
(Growth rates in In percent)
Weights 
1/ 2013 2014 2015 2016
Latin 
America 20.8 3.2 0.6 0.7 2.4
USA 17.8 2.2 2.4 2.9 2.7
China 12.7 7.7 6.7 6.5 6.3
EU 12.2 -0.4 1.5 1.7 1.7
Switzerland 7.0 1.9 2.0 0.8 1.2
Japan 4.1 1.6 0.9 1.5 0.4
Other 25.4 1.6 2 2 2.5
Total 
weights 100.0
Weighted 
growth rate 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.7
Source: BCRP and IMF.
 1/ Refers to country weights in 2008-14 exports of Goods & Services.
III. Internal Adjustment Challenge
As the world economy adjusts to a “new normal” in terms 
of global trade and GDP growth, Peru also needs to adjust 
and maximize opportunities from such a change. This section 
summarizes Peru´s economic record and resource reallocation 
to date; the initial conditions as Peru enters the downswing; 
and the challenges ahead for policy makers.
The journey so far
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The broad picture of Peru’s macroeconomic developments 
during the last 15 years, say, could be depicted in three broad 
phases, as evidenced, as well, in other mining countries 
around the world.
The first phase could be characterized by a very strong/
significant improvement in terms of trade (commodity prices), 
which only slowed down with the outbreak of the 2008 financial 
crisis (i.e., sharp drop in food and energy prices and deflation 
in the US). Thereafter, the terms of trade peaked again in 2011, 
before starting to decline. Yet, even after the recent drop, the 
terms of trade are much higher than the levels registered in the 
early 2000s. (Chart 2)
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Figure 2. Peru: Terms of Trade, 2000-2014 (Index, 2012=100)
Source: BCRP, INEI and authors’ estimate.
The second phase has been a very large increase in investment 
in the mining sector, i.e., Peru’s resource sector (Chart 3). 
The latest information published by the National Institute of 
Statistics and Information (INEI) indicates that total mining 
investment undertaken in Peru between 2007 and 2014 was 
around US$46 billion, which is broadly in line with the amount 
of US$53 billion in mining investment outlays reported in the 
study by the Peruvian Institute of Economics (IPE 2012). The 
bulk of this investment was in the exploration of copper (some 
US$30 billion, including, notably, Las Bambas in Apurimac, 
Cerro Verde’s expansion in Arequipa, and Quellaveco in 
Moquegua).
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Figure 3. Peru: Mining Sector Investment , 2000-2014 (Index, 
2012=100)
Source: BCRP, INEI and authors’ estimate.
The third phase has been a sizeable increase in mining export 
receipts, in particular, and export volumes to a lesser extent, 
albeit extraordinary by historical standards (Charts 4). Mining 
export volumes (copper, iron ore, and zinc, in particular) 
rose sharply between 2000 and 2008/09 and recovered again 
in 2012/13, in the aftermath of the global recession. During 
2014/15, export volumes have remained somewhat stagnant, 
albeit at a high level for historical standards. In dollar terms, 
copper export receipts peaked to about US$26 billion in 2010-
13, compared with export receipts of about US$6.3 billion in 
the early 2000s. Gold exports have also been very profitable 
for Peru, totaling some US$8-9 billion dollars in recent years, 
compared with export revenues of less than US$2 billion in the 
early 2000s; this has been largely on account of the evolution of 
international gold prices. Zinc and Iron ore export receipts have 
averaged about US$1.5 billion and US$800 million, respectively, 
during the last 5 years.
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Figure 4. Peru: Mining Exports: Volume & Value, 2000-2014 
(Index 2012=100)
Source: BCRP, INEI and authors’ estimates.
While the three phases of mining sector development have 
overlapped, we are very much in the third phase with sizeable 
mining production for historical standards, although the 
terms of trade and investment flows are much lower than a 
few years ago. Going forward, export volumes may show some 
resilience despite the reduction international prices, as marginal 
costs of production reportedly remain below international 
prices due to sizeable past investment outlays in the mines. At 
the same time, current investment will be gradually converging 
to more “normal” levels, as construction works of mega-mining 
projects: Toromocho (Junín), Constancia (Cusco), and Las 
Bambas (Apurimac) come to an end and exports take off.
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Resource reallocation to date
Notably, during the first two phases of the resources boom 
there was an important reallocation of resources within the 
Peruvian economy. This was important to avoid bottlenecks 
and possible overheating in the markets for goods, labor and 
other factors of production.
Elements sketching the reallocation of resources during the 
upswing of Peru’s business cycle include:
1. The relatively high growth rates of employment creation 
in the top 9 mining departments during 2001-2008, 
propelled by work in the mines and the use of the mining 
¨canon¨ to finance local governments ‘public works 
(Table 3).1 During 2001-2008, employment creation in the 
top 9 mining centers was almost as large (84 percent) as 
in the rest of the economy, excluding Lima. Since, 2009, 
however, job creation in the mining centers has lagged 
somewhat, compared to developments elsewhere in the 
economy, but the share of mining sector employment in 
total employment has remained broadly unchanged (Chart 
5). Local and regional governments receipts on account 
of the mining canon totaled about PEN 33 billion during 
1996-2013 (i.e., about 23% percent of the consolidated 2013 
GDP of all nine top mining regions) and have been used for 
public works (i.e., investment projects and infrastructure) 
according to the legislation.2
1 The mining canon (canon minero) is a central government transfer to the local 
and regional governments hosting mining activities within their jurisdictions. 
The transfer is equivalent to 50 percent of the income tax paid by the mining 
companies to the fiscal treasury. The canon is distributed across the various 
levels of local and regional governments according to a pre-determined formula.
2 See, Sociedad Nacional de Minería, Petróleo, y Energía (2013).
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Table 3
Peru: Employment Creation By Department, 2001-2014
Departments Employment growth rates 
(In %)
Employment gains (In 
thousands)
2001-
2008
2008-
2011
2011-
2014
2001-
2008
2008-
2011
2011-
2014
Amazonas 19.1 6.0 -2.0 35.1 13.1 -4.5
Áncash 21.0 -0.1 6.0 102.9 -0.7 35.4
Apurímac 12.8 2.4 5.4 27.0 5.8 13.3
Arequipa 17.1 8.3 4.5 90.2 51.1 30.5
Ayacucho 20.1 3.5 7.1 55.2 11.4 24.3
Cajamarca 19.8 -2.7 -0.6 139.0 -22.7 -4.8
Cusco 14.8 3.5 2.9 91.7 24.6 21.3
Huancavelica 12.6 6.9 5.8 25.9 16.1 14.4
Huánuco 19.6 4.1 4.2 69.4 17.5 18.5
Ica 20.3 7.6 2.9 63.5 28.8 11.9
Junín 21.5 4.4 1.1 118.5 29.5 7.8
La Libertad 21.3 8.6 5.0 147.0 71.6 45.7
Lambayeque 28.0 3.8 -0.5 133.5 23.4 -3.2
Loreto 23.4 4.9 5.6 86.8 22.4 26.7
Madre de Dios 43.8 7.1 9.6 20.1 4.7 6.8
Moquegua 16.9 7.6 4.5 13.5 7.0 4.5
Pasco 18.5 16.1 1.5 20.8 21.5 2.3
Piura 20.5 1.7 5.2 146.4 14.9 45.8
Puno 10.9 5.9 4.4 72.5 43.8 34.4
San Martín 29.1 9.2 0.3 90.5 37.0 1.4
Tacna 21.7 3.5 2.7 30.7 6.0 4.7
Tumbes 26.4 6.2 1.7 25.2 7.4 2.2
Ucayali 42.9 8.8 6.6 72.0 21.0 17.2
Lima y Callao 23.6 6.5 1.6 987.5 335.4 90.6
Memo items:
Top 9 mining 
departments 18.2 5.3 3.4 750.7 187.8 155.9
All other departments 24.5 5.7 4.1 1879.3 589.9 295.9
All other departments, 
excl. Lima 24.6 5.6 4.3 891.7 254.5 205.3
Source: INEI & authors’ estimates.
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Figure 5. Peru: Economic Active Population by Department, 
2001-2014 (% of Total)
Source: BCRP, INEI, and authors’ estimates.
2. The sheer magnitude of the average overall growth rates 
of the 9 top mining centers (6.1 percent) supported an 
important resource reallocation, as measured by financial 
and real sector variables (Table 4 and Charts 6 and 7). On 
the one hand, during 2002-2008, the annual growth rates 
of bank deposits and private sector credit in the mining 
centers were in the high double-digits and were generally 
higher than the growth rate registered in the rest of the 
Peruvian economy. Growth rates of financial variables 
in mining and non-mining geographical departments 
decelerated sharply in 2009, but have since then recovered 
significantly. On the other hand, according to the latest 
Poverty Map published by the INEI, the poverty incidence 
is currently less concentrated in the traditional rural areas 
of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac (the so-called 
Trapecio Andino), although poverty persists in the northern 
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highlands, including numerous districts in two mining 
centers, such as Cajamarca and La Libertad.3 According 
to experts, the gold extracting mining project of Conga in 
Cajamarca could propel an economic surge of the region, but 
labor/social tensions persist between the local communities 
and the interested investor to date.
3. The magnitude of the mining sector´s Input-Output table 
multipliers should have benefitted a number of economic 
activities supplying and/or demanding mining sector 
products and related goods & services, same as in other 
mineral-rich countries. Indeed, an IPE study found that 
mining has relatively important forward multipliers into 
the rest of the economy (i.e., mining supplies inputs to other 
economic sectors), as well as backward multipliers (i.e., 
mining consumes services from other sectors, particularly 
manufacturing products, transport, storage, chemicals, 
water and electricity). The study also noted that in 2007, the 
mining sector’s value added (i.e., gross output (VBP) minus 
intermediate consumption) was the largest in the economy, 
equivalent to 13.2 percent of GDP, INEI (2012).
3 See INEI (2015).
29
Journal of Economics, Finance and 
International Business
Figure 6. Peru: Bank Credit Growth by Department, 2003-2014 
(In percent)
Source: BCRP, INEI, and authors’ estimates.
Figure 7. Peru: Bank Deposit Growth by Department, 2003-2014 
(In percent)
Source: BCRP, INEI, and authors’ estimates.
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The initial conditions as Peru enters the downswing
Going forward, despite Peru’s recent economic deceleration 
(in aggregate and in GDP per capita), there are elements that 
seem likely to underpin its good performance. These elements 
refer to: (i) resilient—albeit much lower than in the past—growth 
rates of the economy supported by resilient growth of private 
consumption; (ii) relatively sound economic and financial 
indicators; and (iii) policy flexibility, particularly monetary 
and exchange rate policy, that has helped the economy transit 
through the business cycle.
Table 4
Peru: Cumulative Mining Investment & Departments’ Economic 
Growth, 2005 - 2014
Departments
Mining Investment 2005-2014
Real GDP Avg. growth rates 
(In %)
(In millions of 
US$)
(In % of 
total) 2001-08 2009-14
Arequipa 7,197 15.4 7.8 3.3
Amazonas 59 0.1 6.3 6.9
Ancash 3,830 8.2 6.1 -0.4
Apurimac 5,442 11.7 5.5 6.6
Ayacucho 476 1.0 7.1 7.1
Cajamarca 5,294 11.3 3.8 3.2
Callao 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cusco 5,721 12.3 8.0 9.1
Huancavelica 757 1.6 2.2 4.3
Huanuco 109 0.2 5.3 5.9
Ica 591 1.3 10.1 6.3
Junin 4,966 10.6 5.3 4.0
La Libertad 3,056 6.5 7.9 4.0
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Lambayeque 2 0.0 5.2 5.8
Lima 1,981 4.2 7.1 6.0
Madre de Dios 44 0.1 7.4 1.0
Moquegua 2,095 4.5 5.8 0.1
Pasco 2,490 5.3 4.9 -0.8
Piura 819 1.8 6.6 5.3
Puno 519 1.1 4.8 5.2
San Martin 0 0.0 6.9 6.0
Tacna 1,216 2.6 4.9 3.7
Tumbes 0 0.0 5.8 5.8
Ucayali 0 0.0 5.8 3.7
Loreto 0 0.0 4.2 3.0
Total investment 46,664 100.0
Memo items (avg. growth rates; 
In %):
Top 9 mining departments 6.1 3.2
All other 
departments 6.0 5.0
All other departments, excluding 
Lima 5.9 5.0
Source: INEI, BCRP, and authors’ estimates.
 ◆ First, the economic conditions remain consistent with an 
expansion of the Peruvian economy that is better than 
elsewhere-in Latin America, but arguably currently below 
the economy’s potential (Table 5). 4 Private consumption 
growth has declined, but remains positive hovering around 
3 percent per annum and recovering according to the 
BCRP’s Inflation Report September 2015 macroeconomic 
projections (Chart 8).
4 See, for example, BCRP, Inflation Report (September 2015).
32
Peru: The External and Internal  Adjustment Challenge
VOL 1 - Nº 1         AUGUST 2017
 ◆ Second, a number of economic and financial indicators 
remain broadly robust and should support the transition 
to a ¨new normal¨:
(a)  The unemployment rate in Lima, which is the country’s 
main economic center, has remained low and broadly 
stable during the last 4 years, at around 6 percent (Chart 
9). Noted, however, with a sizeable (i.e., 35 percent) 
share of underemployment in total employment.
(b)  Business expectations have deteriorated since early 
2015, but remain generally above their mid-2012 to mid-
2013 bottommost (Chart 10).
(c)  Household indebtedness is low by international 
standards (some 48 percent of household disposable 
income) and should provide space for financial 
deepening, even after correcting for households’ income 
concentration (Table 6).
(d)  Corporate indebtedness, while possibly somewhat 
elevated for some business sectors (and/or type of 
enterprise) of the economy, it is still relatively low as a 
percentage of GDP, while the companies’ fundamentals 
remain strong (Tables 6 & 7).
33
Journal of Economics, Finance and 
International Business
Table 5
Peru & Latin American Partners: Real GDP Growth Rates, 2013-2017 
(In percent)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Peru (BCRP) 5.8 2.4 3.1 4.2 5.0
Brazil 2.7 0.1 -1.5 0.5 2.3
Mexico 1.4 2.1 2.4 3.0 3.5
Venezuela 0.5 -3.0 -4.2 0.0 0.0
Chile 4.3 1.9 2.5 3.1 3.6
Colombia 4.9 4.6 2.9 2.8 3.7
Ecuador 4.5 -3.0 1.0 3.3 3.3
Bolivia 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Memo item:
Avg. growth rate, excluding 
Peru 3.0 0.7 0.8 2.2 2.7
Source: IMF, BCRP, and The Economist magazine.
Figure 8. Peru: Private Consumption Growth Rate, 1999-2017 
(In percent)
Source: BCRP Inflation Report estimates & projections (Sept. 2015).
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Figure 9. Metropolitan Lima: Unemployment Rate, 2012-2015 
(In percent)
Source: INEI.
Figure 10. Peru: Business Expectations Survey, Dec. 2010-Aug. 
2015
Source: BCRP & authors’ estimates. 
(Deviation from Avg. since Jan. 2007)
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Table 6
Peru: Households and Corporate Debt, 2013-2015
Dec. 2013 Jun. 2014 Dec.2014 Jun. 2015
(In percent of GDP)
Total debt  42.33  43.84  45.56  46.19
 Households (HH) debt  13.23  13.56  14.03  14.49
 Consumption loans  7.59  7.74  8.02  8.41
 Mortgage loans  5.64  5.82  6.02  6.09
 Corporates’ debt  29.10  30.28  31.53  31.70
 Debt to local Fin. System  24.08  24.80  25.12  25.29
 External debt 1/  4.16  4.62  5.70  5.70
 Other domestic debt  0.86  0.86  0.71  0.71
Memo item:
Household debt (% HH disposable 
income)
 44.10  45.20  46.78  48.31
HH disposable income 2/  163,666  169,135  172,535  177,212
Source: BCRP, Inflation Report, various issues, BCRP data, and author’s estimates. 
1/ Valued at current exchange rates. Refers to non-financial corporations, only. 
2/ Assumes that households’ disposable income is 30% of nominal GDP. The 
difference being profits, taxes and depreciation of cpital (i.e., GDP from income side).
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Table 7
Peru: Fundamentals of Corporations in Various Economic Sectors 
(As of 2014)
Return on 
Equity Leverage 1/
Interest cost 
coverage 2/
Mining 
sector 3% 80% 600%
Industrial 
sector 6% 100% 500%
Public 
services 16% 70% 1200%
Source: BCRP (2015), Financial Stability Report. 
1/ Debt to equity ratio. 
2/ Operational profits as percent of total financial costs.
 ◆ Third, during the last decade, there has been monetary 
and exchange rate policy flexibility that has helped 
the economy adjust through the business cycle (Charts 
11 and 12). Indeed, the exchange rate has been broadly 
flexible: appreciating during the resources boom and now 
depreciating, as the external sector conditions weakened. 
Also, an accommodative monetary policy has been 
supportive of economic growth in a context of a weak 
external environment during the last 8 years, or so. 5
5 Monetary easing has bee implemented while guarding excessive foreign 
exchange volatility and ensuring banks’ liquidity on their dollar-denominated 
deposits. The central bank has reduced bank reserve requirements on soles-
denominated bank deposits and sharply cut its reference rate in an effort to 
provide liquidity to the interbank money market, as needed. These measures 
were complemented by increases in reserve requirement ratios applicable on 
banks’ dollar deposits that improved banks’ dollar liquidity ratios (defined as 
the ratio of dollar liquid assets to liquid liabilities).
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Analysis of equilibrium real exchange rates conducted by the 
Central Bank of Peru suggests that, in general, since the mid-
1990s, there have not been major misalignments between the 
actual and the equilibrium real effective exchange rate for the 
Peruvian sol. 6 According to the monetary authorities, Peru´s 
actual real effective exchange rate has been broadly in line with 
fundamentals. The latter being mainly Peru´s aggregate relative 
productivity levels vis-à-vis trading partners, the terms of 
trade, the economy´s degree of openness, the net international 
investment position, and the relative size of the government. 
The broad alignment between actual and equilibrium exchange 
rate levels has been the result of foreign exchange intervention to 
reduce excessive short term volatility of the nominal exchange 
rate, while taking into account the role of fundamentals, 
according to the central bank staff.
While the central bank´s analysis is most comforting, further 
expert analytical work should consolidate the overall exchange 
rate assessment and provide robust evidence that the are 
indeed no major exchange rate misalignments. For example, 
in assessing equilibrium exchange rates, it may be important 
to differentiate the impact on the real exchange rate from 
productivity gains in the tradable and the non-tradable goods 
sectors, rather than using an aggregate relative productivity 
index in explaining movements of the real exchange rate. 
Productivity gains in the domestic tradable goods sector (vis-
a-vis productivity gains in trading partners) should appreciate 
the real exchange rate, as the Balassa-Samuelson effect plays 
on.7 By contrast, relative productivity gains in the domestic 
6 See, BCRP (2015), pages 109-110, and Rodriguez and Winkelried (2011).
7 The Balassa-Samuelson effect suggests that an increase in wages in the tradable 
goods sector of an economy will also lead to higher wages in the non-tradable 
(service) sector of the economy. The accompanying increase in inflation makes 
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non-tradable goods sector (e.g., faster and better barbers, for 
example) should reduce non-tradable prices and thus depreciate 
the real exchange rate. 8 9
Figure 11. Peru: Terms of Trade and Nominal ER (PEN/US$), 
1996-2015 (Indices, 2007=100)
Source: BCRP and authors’ estimates.
inflation rates higher in faster growing economies than it is in slow growing 
economies.
8 Krugman et al (2012), pages 407-408, provides a detailed explanation on how an 
increase in a country’s relative non-tradable productivity is associated with real 
exchange depreciation, whereas an increase in relative tradable productivity 
exerts appreciation pressure (í.e.: Balassa-Samuelson effect).
9 To our knowledge, no other analysts have tried before the distinction between 
tradable and non-tradable sectors in equilibrium exchange rate analysis in Peru. 
To be sure, bundling both tradable and non-tradable productivities into a single 
variable, without considering their opposite effects on the real exchange rate, 
can lead to omitted variable bias in a regression framework.
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Figure 12. Peru: Short Term Interest Rates, 2007-2015 (In percent)
Source: BCRP.
Table 8, first column, shows the results from our empirical 
analysis, which importantly distinguishes between 
productivity gains in the tradable and the non-tradable 
sectors. Both variables are found to be determinants of the 
long-run bilateral PEN/US dollar real exchange rate. Tellingly, 
all right hand side variables are statistically significant and 
their coefficients show the correct signs. As expected, a relative 
increase in Peru’s tradable industries’ productivity (such as 
mining) seems strongly associated with a real exchange rate 
appreciation, whereas the opposite holds for productivity 
increases in the non-tradable sectors (such as services). The 
statistical analysis uses the PEN/USD real bilateral exchange 
rate as the dependent variable so as to better compare 
productivity variables in Peru and the US, whose productivity 
data, on a disaggregated basis, are published on a regular basis 
by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics. For a practical matter, 
we were unable to construct productivity variables for each of 
Peru’s trading partners due to constraints on data availability.
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Table 8.
Real Exchange Rate Models- Regression Analysis Output
Dependent variable
Bilateral real 
exchange rate
Real effective 
exchange rate
(Peru - USA; - 
appreciation,
(BIS, rebased, + 
appreciation,
+ depreciation) - depreciation)
Sample (months) Sept. 2003-Sept. 2015 Sept. 2003-Sept. 2015
(145 observations) (145 observations)
Estimation method OLS logarithims OLS logarithims
Explanatory variables 1/
Relative productivity in tradable 
sectors -0.1873 * 0.2802 ***
(Peru relative to United States) (0.1102) (0.0871)
Relative productivity in non-tradable 
sectors 0.2570 * 0.3368 ***
(Peru relative to United States) (0.1432) (0.1110)
Terms of trade -0.1514 *** 0.0150
(seasonally adjusted) (0.0497) (0.0418)
Monetary policy rate differential 0.0319 *** -0.0143 ***
(Fed funds rate minus BCRP 
reference rate)
(0.0022) (0.0019)
Net international investment position 
(as % GDP)
-0.0069 *** 0.0004
(0.0013) (0.0016)
Trade openness (exports plus 
imports, as % GDP)
0.5101 *** -0.1131
(0.1145) (0.1409)
Peru’s EMBI spread (country risk) 0.0840 *** -0.0346 **
(0.0167) (0.0137)
Public spending (as % GDP) 0.3001 ***
(0.0606)
Intercept (constant) -0.3022 3.7687
(0.6620) (0.9048)
R-squared 0.8951 0.7495
Ajusted R-squared 0.8597 0.7348
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Data source: BIS, Bloomberg, BCRP, INEI, Haver Analytics and authrors’ estimates. 
1/ Standard errors are given in parenthesis under coefficients; individual coefficients 
are statistically significant at * 90%; ** 95%; and *** 99% confidence levels.
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Table 8, second column, regresses Peru’s multilateral trade 
weighted real effective exchange rate (REER) against an 
almost similar set of explanatory variables and confirms their 
explanatory power, albeit noting some marginal appreciation 
of the REER as of September 2015 (Chart 13). 10 Most of the 
variables are statistically significant and show the correct signs 
(note that the signs are opposite to those in the other regression 
because the dependent variable has been rebased). Notably, a 
key insight from this specification is that Peru’s REER appeared 
overvalued by 4.7 percent as of September 2015.
Figure 13. Real Effective Exchange Rate Equation – actual, 
fitted, residual
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As of September 2015, 
Peru's REER was 
overvlued by 4.7%
Source: BIS, Bloomberg, BCRP, INEI, Haver Analytics and authrors’ estimates.
10 Download Peru’s REER time series at https://www.bis.org/statistics/eer.
htm?m=6%7C187
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The overvaluation of the real exchange rate is arguably larger 
with respect to the other four Latin American inflation-
targeting countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil), 
which are also Peru’s competitors in several manufacturing 
industries (Chart 14 and 15). Indeed, these countries’ respective 
currencies have undergone much severe depreciations since 
the FED’s tapering announcement shocked emerging market 
currencies worldwide back in May 2013. Peru’s non-traditional 
exports (other than agriculture) have also witnessed an 
important deceleration in real terms since then.
Figure 14. Peru’s real exchange rate with respect to Latin 
American inflation-targeting countries (Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, and Brazil) (Rebased, + appreciation, - depreciation) 
(Index, August 1992=100)
Source: Source: Bloomberg, BCRP, INEI, Haver Analytics and authors’ estimates
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Figure 15. Non-Traditonal Exports FOB, Dec. 2009-Aug. 2015 
(Thousands of 2002 US$)
Source: INEI and authors’ estimates.
Confronting the new normal: The task ahead
There are some key areas of reform as Peru enters the ¨new 
normal¨ of lower growth abroad and at home. These include: (i) 
supporting new sources of growth to complement traditionally 
outward-oriented mining and agriculture; (ii) further opening 
up the economy to foreign direct investment, while supporting 
a strong growth of fixed capital formation in machinery and 
equipment that is rather expensive by regional standards; 
and (iii) adding flexibility to the labor market that would 
increase labor productivity and allow sustained wage growth 
notwithstanding the underlying economic deceleration.
Support new sources of growth
Tourism may be an important economic growth pillar, but its 
earlier expansion appears to have weakened in recent years 
(Chart 16). The tourist sector grew very rapidly through 2012, 
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but it may now be losing steam, as measured by the number 
of incoming tourists and available beds. Furthermore, from a 
national accounts perspective, the sector´s value-added growth 
has been flat at around 1 percent per year since mid-2011.
Fostering the tourist sector should have important forward 
and backward Input-Output multipliers. Indeed, a case could 
be made that the hotels and restaurants sector has important 
growth multipliers as a result of using the output of a number 
of other sectors as key inputs, but also as a result of the sector 
having minimal leakages, being a service sector. Given that 
the output of the sector is consumed locally (as it is a final 
consumption good), the output of tourism is not exported for 
further value addition. On the other hand, the sector consumes 
the outputs of the agricultural and fishing sectors, transport 
sector (transporting guests around the country as well as to the 
country), manufactured goods and general business services.
According to experts, tourism of pre- and post-colonial 
monuments (i.e., Turismo Monumental) is a possible niche 
to further develop. 11 Peru, and in particular Lima, houses 
numerous catholic convents and churches, as well as pre- and 
post-colonial sites that are highly regarded tourist attractions to 
date. The challenge would be the preservation and development 
of new sites, some of which, although near the capital or other 
large cities, remain under- developed due to local government’s 
and municipalities’ budget constraints and/or different policy 
priorities. Yet, the estimated daily expenses per visiting tourist 
to religious and historical sites is rather quite attractive and 
with potential for expansion.
11 See, Universidad del Pacifico (2015).
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Also, a new engine of growth could be to widen the spectrum 
of non-traditional exports in the fishing, fruits and vegetables 
and processed food industries, which are activities within 
the known “product space” to local exporters. According to 
Hausmann and Klinger (2008), export businesses in fresh and 
processed fish and seafood (e.g., fish fillets, other fish meat, fish 
salted or dried, mollusks, aquatic invertebrates), as well as in 
fresh, dried and preserved vegetables and fruits, are relatively 
akin, albeit more “sophisticated” export baskets than existing 
non-traditional export businesses. With more than 30 years 
of experience in exports in fishing and agroindustry, local 
investors are very much aware as to the tasks and opportunities 
of extending the value chain of these labor-intensive non-
traditional export pillars. Operating within a known product 
space would also minimize coordination failures of moving to 
new (possibly unknown) export activities.
Figure 16. Peru: Tourism: No. of Incoming Tourists & Beds 
Available, 2005-14
Source: Superintendencia Nacional de Migraciones.
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Further opening the economy to FDI
By international standards, Peru is a relatively close emerging 
economy, as measured by standard financial ratios (Table 9 
and Charts 17). The openness of the economy—as measured by 
the joined share of exports and imports of goods and services 
in GDP—is 46 percent, on average, compared to ratios of above 
50 percent of GDP in other country comparators. Also, the 
country´s international investment position (on the liability 
side) shows that the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
as a share of GDP, has been generally unchanged at about 25 
percent of GDP for long, before rising to about 35 percent of 
GDP only in 2012-2014.
Further, while the recent increases in FDI (as a share of GDP) 
are outmost welcomed, they largely reflect mining companies´ 
reinvestment of profits, which may be under stress given 
recent drops in international metal prices (Chart 18). Most FDI 
that took place between 2004 and 2014 was financed by miners’ 
reinvestment of profits—rather than by new and diversified 
funding sources—that helped fund construction activities and 
import of machinery and equipment for the local mines. As 
international prices decline, these FDI flows, including their 
direct and indirect macroeconomic effects, are likely to decline, 
unless new sectors of the economy become attractive for foreign 
investors.
A strong and sustainable economy-wide growth of FDI 
should provide a resource transfer in terms of financial and 
human capital. FDI could be a source of important economic 
multipliers in the domestic economy given its sheer financial 
magnitude and the working practices it establishes. The latter 
refers mainly to its sourcing of inputs (goods and labor) in the 
formal economy. Spillovers in terms of know-how transfer could 
also be a catalyst for a surge of domestic private investment.
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Table 9
Trade Openness, Average 2000-2014 (Commodity Exports & 
Imports in % GDP)
Peru 46.0
Argentina 32.8
Bolivia 67.4
Brazil 25.8
Chile 68.2
Colombia 36.0
Ecuador 57.5
Mexico 57.3
Uruguay 52.2
Venezuela 50.7
Memo items:
Median excluding Peru 52.2
OECD members 49.1
Upper middle income 58.0
World 54.2
United States 26.5
China 50.1
Source: The World Bank.
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Figure 17. Peru: Intl. Investment Position Liabilities, 2001-March 
2015 (In % GDP)
Source: BCRP.
Figure 18. Peru: FDI Funding Sources, 2004-2014 (In millions of 
US$)
Source: BCRP and authors’ estimates.
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Supporting a strong growth of machinery and equipment 
outlays
While opening up the economy, there is also a need to tightly 
focus on the relationship between economic growth and 
investment in machinery and equipment. Evidence from 
across the world and Peru shows that outlays in machinery 
and equipment have the strongest statistical correlation with 
economic growth than any other component of investment 
(i.e., investment in construction activity and/or change in 
inventories).12 Another conclusion from the analysis is that 
countries profiting from relatively cheap capital goods tends to 
grow faster than otherwise. The latter may be an issue for Peru, 
as we explain below.
Price and quantity data on machinery and equipment 
published by the 2011 World Bank International Comparison 
Program (ICP) suggest that capital goods are relatively 
expensive in Peru and could create a drag on economic growth 
(Table 10).13 14 In particular, the ICP information on price 
levels shows that machinery and equipment in Peru is much 
more expensive than in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Uruguay, despite these countries’ higher GDP per capita. In 
terms of quantities, Peru´s outlays in machinery and equipment 
represent a lower share of total gross fixed capital formation 
(GFKF) than in the rest of Latin America (i.e., construction 
works are rather important in Peru), although we are above the 
Latin American average in terms of outlays in machinery and 
12 See, in particular, Barro (1990), Jones (1994), and Loayza (2005).
13 See World Bank (2015).
14 The ICP is an ongoing effort by the World Bank to compile disaggregated 
national accounts data on a purchasing power parity basis (PPP). Estimates on 
a PPP basis provide for sounder comparisons of income per capita and GDP 
components for countries around the world.
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equipment as a share of GDP. For comparison, while GFKF in 
Chile is lower than in Peru (20.7 percent of GDP compared with 
25.1 percent in Peru), machinery and equipment in Chile is 21 
percent cheaper (i.e., 97.6/123.5 in Table 9) than in Peru, and 
Chile invests a relatively larger share of GFKF in machinery 
and equipment (42.5 percent) than Peru (37.1 percent). The 
latter could have important implication for the economy´s long-
run growth potential and deserves the Peruvian authorities´ 
attention.
Moreover, differences in price levels for machinery and 
equipment in Chile and Peru exacerbate disparities in 
investment to GDP ratios between Chile and Peru, that 
somewhat vanish once we correct for variances in price 
levels (Table 11). In particular, using Chile’s price levels to re-
compute the value of GFKF reduces Peru’s GFKF value from 
the equivalent of 25.1 percent of GDP to 20.9 percent of GDP 
in 2011, which is roughly Chile’s ratio of GFKF to nominal 
GDP. Peru’s reduced investment ratios persist (@ 21.8 percent 
of GDP) and broadly converge to the Latin American average 
(excluding Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay)
even after assuming a volume (elasticity) effect in Peru’s 
demand for capital goods due to lower prices of capital and a 
broadly constant capital/output ratio.
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Table 10
Latin America: GDP per Capita & Outlays in Machinery & 
Equipment (2011)
GDP per capita (US 
dollars)
Machinery & Equipment
Price level 
Index
@ current 
ERs.
@ PPP 
basis
(world = 
100)
Share of 
GDP
Share of 
GFKF 1/
Bolivia 2360 5557 89.7 10.6 59.0
Brazil 12874 14639 114.3 10.1 58.6
Chile 14546 20216 97.6 8.8 42.5
Colombia 7142 11360 117.0 8.3 36.6
Ecuador 5226 9932 124.6 8.4 53.3
Mexico 10115 16377 101.4 6.7 31.5
Paraguay 3836 7193 124.7 7.0 46.4
Peru 6066 10981 123.5 9.3 37.1
Uruguay 13722 17343 122.9 6.0 24.0
Venezuela 10731 16965 147.3 8.0 31.1
Memo item:
Avg. 
excluding 
Peru
8950 13287 115.5 8.2 42.6
Source: The World Bank 2011 International Comparison Program (ICP) databank. 
1/ Gross fixed capital formation (GFKF) includes outlays in machinery and 
equipment and outlays in construction activities.
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Table 11
Nominal GDP & Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFKF)
Nominal 
GDP GFKF
@ current 
ER 1/
Nominal @ current 
ER 1/
In % 
GDP
Bolivia 23.9 4.2 17.7
Brazil 2476.6 448.3 18.1
Chile 251.2 52.0 20.7
Colombia 336.3 76.7 22.8
Ecuador 79.8 12.6 15.8
Mexico 1170.1 249.2 21.3
Paraguay 25.2 3.8 15.1
Peru (original) 180.7 45.4 25.1
 @ Chile GFKF prices 171.2 35.8 20.9
 @ Chile GFKF prices + 
volume hike 2/ 182.0 37.6 20.7
Uruguay 46.4 8.3 17.8
Venezuela 316.5 72.8 23.0
Memo item:
Average excluding Peru 19.1
Average excluding Peru, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay 20.6
Source: ICP databank and authors’ estimates.
1/ In billions of US dollars @ current exchange rates US$/PEN. 
2/ Assumes increased demand for capital goods due to lower prices of capital and 
marginally higher GDP growth. than in baseline due to higher investment ratio.
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Add flexibility to the labor market
This section analyses what happened to unit labor costs 
(ULCs), measured as the ratio of compensation to employees 
to output per employee, in various economic sectors during 
2001-2014.
The overall picture that emerges is that the growth of ULCs 
(or wage inflation) has been rather limited across economic 
sectors, except for construction and the primary sector. 
However, wage inflation in the construction may have unlikely 
diminished the sector’s profit margins given the sharp rise in 
the price per square meter of an apartment in Lima, for example. 
Also, for the primary sector, the increase in international terms 
of trade must have sheltered profit margins despite hikes in 
ULCs.
Another observation is that Peru’s manufacturing sector 
may have lost external competitiveness during the last 
decade, notwithstanding a limited growth of its ULCs. The 
sector’s performance remains challenging vis-à-vis its Latin 
American country competitors despite significant increases 
in labor productivity that paralleled important increases in 
wages. Going forward, barring for a significant depreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate, the task is to accelerate labor 
productivity growth, while guarding the growth of wages to 
support employment, as the domestic and international market 
performance remains weak.
Facts
1. ULCs in the construction and the primary sectors increased 
by more (around 50 percent) than the cumulative CPI 
inflation (43 percent), while in commerce, ULCs increases 
were nil (see Chart 19).
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2. For all sectors in the economy, except commerce, increases 
in wages were larger than increases in productivity (Chart 
20). Wages in the primary sector increased the most, but 
the sector also registered a relatively large increase in labor 
productivity.
3. The commerce sector showed the tightest alignment 
between cumulative hikes in wages and productivity, 
possibly reflecting sharp formal and informal sector 
competition in the sector.
4. By 2012, wages and ULCs growth in the primary sector 
already showed some deceleration along the decline in 
export unit prices, although profit margins in the sector 
may still remain high given the cumulate increase in export 
unit prices in recent years (Chart 21).
5. By contrast, in the construction sector, wage growth has 
shown no sign of abating since 2007. However, profit 
margins in the sector must have increased along the sharp 
hike in the price per square meter of an apartment in Lima, 
particularly since 2011 (Chart 22).
Figure 19. Peru: ULC and CPI Cumulative Increases, 2001-14 (In 
%)
Source: INEI, BCRP, and authors’ estimates.
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Figure 20. Peru: ULCs Decomposition: Cumulative Increase, 
2001-14 (In %)
Source: INEI, BCRP, and authors’ estimates.
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Figure 21. Peru: Primary Sector ULC Decomposition, 2001-14 
(Index, 2001=100)
Source: INEI, BCRP, and authors’ estimates.
Figure 22. Peru: Construction Sector ULC Decomposition, 2001-
14 (Index, 2001=100)
Source: INEI, BCRP, and authors’ estimates.
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Competitiveness of Peruvian manufacturing
Analysis of ULCs in manufacturing provides insights as to the 
sector’s external competitiveness; particularly vis-à-vis main 
Latin American partners (LATAM) who are key destination of 
Peru are manufacturing products. 15
The analysis shows that ULCs in manufacturing have been 
broadly stable since 2009, despite sharp increases in wages 
(Chart 23). Welcomed hikes in labor productivity, particularly 
since 2010, have helped contain increases in ULCs and are 
possibly related to a change in the composition on the sector’s 
labor force. The latter refers mainly to labor shedding in terms 
of a reduction of low-productivity workers, which considered 
under-employed for labor survey purposes, while the number 
of those fully employed increased in recent years (Chart 24).
However, comparing the evolution of Peru’s manufacturing 
ULCs against measures in trading partners suggests that 
international competitiveness has deteriorated since 2012. 
Chart 25 plots Peru’s manufacturing ULCs and a trade-weighted 
nominal effective exchange rate (LATAM NEER) against the US 
dollar for a basket of currencies including the Brazil’s real, the 
Chilean, Colombian and Mexican peso. Two points to note:
 ◆ The chart shows broad alignment of Peru’s ULC measure 
(in domestic currency; PEN) relative to the LATAM 
NEER between 2005 and 2012. Thereafter, however, 
Peru’s ULC measure remains broadly unchanged, while 
competitiveness of main trading partner increased due to 
15 Manufacturing sector ULCs through 2014 use data published in the INEI 2015 
Compendio Estadístico. ULCs data for September 2015 are the authors’ estimates 
using information from the quarterly national accounts and the INEI quarterly 
reports on employment by sector in Lima Metropolitana. Data for Lima were used 
as a proxy of national employment developments.
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the depreciation of these countries’ nominal exchange rates 
against the US dollar.
 ◆ Measured in US dollars, the deterioration of Peru’s 
international competitiveness is more marked and lasting. 
This is due to the appreciation of the PEN against the US 
dollar in the mid-2000s, although the depreciation of the 
PEN against the US dollar since 2012 has reversed some of 
the ULC’s increases registered early in the decade.
The findings under the (relative) ULCs analysis for 
manufacturing are consistent with an estimated appreciation 
of Peru’s real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis main Latin 
American trading partners, as reported earlier (see Chart 14). 
Going forward, there is thus a need of enhanced real exchange 
rate flexibility accompanied by greater labor market flexibility 
to accelerate labor productivity growth and sustain wage 
and employment gains despite a weak external environment. 
Such combination of enhanced exchange rate flexibility 
and a containment of unit labor costs should invigorate the 
implementation of sectorial policies, as those included in Peru’s 
current Productive Diversification Plan, for example, and 
support a lasting surge of private investment and an increase 
potential output.16
16 Main ideas on Peru’s Productive Diversification Plan can be found in Ghezzi 
and Gallardo (2013) and recent official documents and publications.
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Figure 23. Peru: Manufacturing Sector ULC Decomposition 
(Index, 2001=100)
Source: INEI and authors’ estimates.
60
Peru: The External and Internal  Adjustment Challenge
VOL 1 - Nº 1         AUGUST 2017
Figure 24. Lima Metropolitana: Manufacturing Sector Total 
Employment: Q3 2009-Q3 2015 (In  thousands of people)
Source: INEI, Informe de Empleo, October 2015.
Figure 25. LATAM Partners & ULCs Manufacturing, 2001-Sept. 
2015 (Index, 2001=100)
Source: BCRP, IMF, and authors’ estimates.
1/ Decline in index reflects depreciation of LATAM trading partners’ nominal 
effectice exchange rate (NEER).
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III. Concluding Remarks
This paper has sketched some of the main external and internal 
macroeconomic challenges confronting Peru over the near- and 
medium-term.
Peru’s macroeconomic challenges could be broadly 
summarized in three main headings. First, the Peruvian 
economy is currently in a period of transition from the biggest 
resource boom since the mid-1950s to something bit more normal. 
Transition to a “new normal” has its own challenges, which, in 
the case of a small open economy like Peru, are currently being 
heightened by a weak external environment. Second, transition 
to a new normal is happening under robust initial conditions, 
which could be summarized by the Peruvian economy’s sound 
fundamentals, and its underlying flexibility. Such flexibility 
helped the economy dealing with the upswing of the mining 
development boom and should help us in the downswing. 
Third, macroeconomic policy—particularly monetary and 
exchange rate policy—is helping in this adjustment, although a 
successful transition may need to be supported by: (i) further-
opening of the economy and supporting hikes in sustainable 
foreign direct investment economy-wide; (ii) fostering a strong 
growth of fixed capital formation in machinery and equipment, 
which is, apparently, relatively expensive by regional standards; 
and (iii) adding flexibility in the local labor market to increase 
labor productivity and sustain wage and employment growth 
despite the hardening of international (and domestic) market 
conditions.
The paper’s appraisal is that Peru is generally well equipped 
to confront the ¨ new normal¨ of slower growth of global trade 
and real GDP given the economy´s transformation during 
the last 15 years. Key elements highlighting the resource 
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reallocation during the period include the sizeable employment 
gains benefitting leading mining centers and their geographical 
surroundings; financial deepening registered in most of those 
regions; the output and income effects generated by relatively 
large Input-Output multipliers stemming from the mining 
sector; and the recorded reduction in poverty indicators in most 
mining communities, as reported by the latest Poverty Map 
published by INEI.
The positive developments in resource-rich mining 
communities have been buttressed by macroeconomic 
indicators and policy flexibility that helped the economy 
adjust during the upswing of the business cycle and should 
again help in the downswing or ¨ new normal¨ confronting the 
Peruvian economy. Key macroeconomic conditions include an 
all-times low unemployment rate, albeit including large under-
employment; resilient business expectations levels; relatively 
low household indebtedness ratio that should provide ¨space¨ 
for financial deepening and smooth private consumption 
patterns; and manageable corporate debt indicators. In addition, 
policy flexibility has been heighten by a relatively flexible 
monetary and exchange rate policy, with the nominal exchange 
rate appreciating during the upswing of the business cycle and, 
more recently, depreciating given the lasting deterioration of 
the external environment.
On the exchange rate, according to the Central Reserve Bank, 
there have not been major misalignments between the actual 
and equilibrium levels of the real effective exchange rate, 
although there is still scope for debate and further analytical 
work. The statistical analysis included in this paper suggests 
that, in assessing equilibrium exchange rates, one should 
differentiate between the impact of growth (productivity) 
performance in the tradable and non-tradable good sectors 
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on the real exchange rate. This is something that is not being 
done in the authorities’ standard exchange rate analysis, but it 
is essential in our view, given the different impacts on the real 
exchange rate from those events. Also, Peru’s trade weighted 
real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis main Latin American 
partners has appreciated significantly in recent years, thus 
suggesting scope for further exchange rate flexibility. The 
paper’s analysis on Peru’s unit labor costs in manufacturing 
vis-à-vis those in main Latin American trading partners further 
confirms an apparent deterioration of Peru’s international 
competitiveness since 2012 and should be food for thought in 
any future discussions about the exchange rate level.
Going forward, Peru needs to address a number of structural 
issues that should help the economy successfully address the 
“new normal” of lower growth abroad and at home.
 ◆ By international standards, Peru is still a relatively closed 
small open economy. Testimony to this regard is the 
somewhat low ratios of international trade flows to GDP 
and the relative limited magnitude of the stock of inward 
FDI to the size of the economy. Also, while the recent 
increases in FDI are outmost welcomed, they largely reflect 
mining companies´ reinvestment of profits, which may 
be under stress given recent drops in international metal 
prices. Against this background, there is a need to foster 
sustainable and economy-wide foreign direct investment 
to provide a hefty financial and human capital resource 
transfer to the local economy.
 ◆ Price and quantity data on machinery and equipment 
published by the 2011 World Bank International 
Comparison Program (ICP) suggest that capital goods are 
relatively expensive in Peru, thus blurring assessments of 
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potential output growth and international comparisons 
of investment to GDP ratios. Indeed, the ICP information 
on price levels shows that (comparable) machinery and 
equipment in Peru is much more expensive than in 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay, despite 
these countries’ higher GDP per capita. This is somewhat 
troublesome, given the international experience suggesting 
that countries profiting from relatively cheap capital 
goods tends to grow faster than otherwise. Furthermore, 
differences in price levels for machinery and equipment 
in Chile and Peru, for example, exacerbate disparities in 
investment to GDP ratios between the two countries that 
somewhat vanish once we correct for variances in price 
levels. As noted in the paper, using Chile’s price levels 
to re-compute the value of gross fixed capital formation 
(GFKF) reduces Peru’s GFKF value from the equivalent of 
25.1 percent of GDP to 20.9 percent of GDP in 2011, which is 
roughly Chile’s ratio of GFKF to nominal GDP.
 ◆ Labor productivity growth in manufacturing needs to 
accelerate, so as to regain external competitiveness that 
has deteriorated in recent years and to sustain wage and 
employment growth despite a weak external environment. 
Such deterioration of manufacturing cost competitiveness 
has been heightened by an appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate vis-à-vis main trading partners in Latin 
America and is hardening policy initiatives, such as Peru’s 
current Productive Diversification Plan, for example.
The recommended structural policy agenda, complemented 
by lasting flexible monetary and exchange rate policies, may be 
the credible way forward to increase Peru’s potential output. 
Alone, a flexible monetary and exchange rate policy framework 
could help during the adjustment phase of lower economic 
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growth, but ultimately Peru will be better off if increased 
investment is driven by high-expected returns (e.g., hikes in 
labor productivity and business opportunities) rather than by 
the low cost of finance stemming from such policy flexibility. 
This is why the relevance of identifying new engines of growth 
in the tradable sector, further opening up the economy while 
supporting sustainable foreign direct investment economy-
wide, and focusing on a strong growth of fixed capital formation 
in machinery and equipment. On external competitiveness, this 
paper calls for enhanced real exchange rate flexibility, as well as 
greater labor market flexibility to accelerate labor productivity 
growth and sustain wage and employment gains despite a 
weak external environment. Such combination of enhanced 
exchange rate flexibility and a containment of unit labor costs 
should, in turn, support a lasting surge of private investment 
and increase potential output.
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